Secure systems from insecure components

In many computer systems today, an attacker that breaks one system component can steal data from millions of users. In this talk, I will present two systems that can withstand component compromise. I will describe (1) a single sign-on system that protects user security and privacy from a compromised single sign-on server, and (2) a secure-hardware-based backup service that protects user backups from compromised secure hardware devices. These systems provide strong security and privacy properties while taking into account practical constraints such as compatibility requirements, hardware limitations, and user expectations. Each splits user secrets across different system components, using new cryptographic tools to provide necessary functionality while protecting user data.

Bio: Emma Dauterman is a Ph.D. candidate at UC Berkeley where she is advised by Raluca Ada Popa and Ion Stoica. Her research interests include computer security, systems, and applied cryptography. She has received the Microsoft Research Ada Lovelace fellowship, the NSF graduate research fellowship, and a UC Berkeley EECS excellence award.

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